


CROSS-CULTURAL COMPETENCE: LEADER REQUIREMENTS FOR  
INTERCULTURAL EFFECTIVENESS IN THE HUMAN DOMAIN

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army  
Command and General Staff College in partial  
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degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE  
General Studies



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## ABSTRACT

**CROSS-CULTURAL COMPETENCE: LEADER REQUIREMENTS FOR  
INTERCULTURAL EFFECTIVENESS IN THE HUMAN DOMAIN**, by Major Shawn  
A. Sebrell, 79 pages.

U.S. strategies focus on conducting increased engagement, and building of relationships and strategic partnerships around the world. The Army has organized regionally-aligned forces designed to provide to the combatant commander a force with enhanced understanding of the cultures, geography, languages, and militaries of the countries where they are likely to be employed, and an ability to impart military knowledge and skills to others. However, experience from recent conflicts has shown the need for more culturally-adept personnel. This paper examines the framework of individual cross-cultural competence, application to Army leaders and doctrine, and relevance to strategy. The Army has well-developed language and regional expertise training programs, but falls short on developing cross-cultural competence as an individual capability. Research shows that specific individual (culture-general) knowledge, skills, attributes, and affect/motivation (KSAs) are a greater indicator for cross-cultural effectiveness than language and regional expertise. These KSAs support adaptability, a necessary characteristic for Army leaders, and can be trained and developed. Army leadership doctrine should update to include these KSAs. Further, within the human domain, culture is operationalized when Army leaders use these KSAs (aided by language and regional expertise) during intercultural encounters to successfully influence others as necessary in order to achieve mission success.

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## ACRONYMS

3C	Cross-Cultural Competence
ACFLS	Army Culture and Foreign Language Strategy
ARI	U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavior and Social Sciences
DoD	Department of Defense
KSA	Knowledge, Skills, Attributes, and Affect/Motivation
LDE	Leader Doctrine and Education
RAF	Regionally-Aligned Forces

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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

The success of future strategic initiatives and the ability of the U.S. to shape a peaceful and prosperous global environment will rest more and more on our ability to understand, influence, or exercise control within the “human domain.”

— Strategic Landpower Task Force,  
*Strategic Landpower: Winning the Clash of Wills*

As the military draws down from Afghanistan and contracts to fit the shrinking budget, it is also looking ahead to what the future holds in an attempt to re-shape the force in anticipation of the demands of the future security environment. Throughout various U.S. strategies, there is a repeated theme of how it is likely to be more unpredictable, complex, asymmetric, and potentially more dangerous than today (*National Intelligence Council Global Trends 2030*, 2012; *Defense Strategic Guidance*, 2012, *National Military Strategy*, 2011). Whether the danger has actually increased or just changed in nature is subject to debate, as are any of the other characterizations. The *Joint Force Capstone Concept*, written in 2012, viewed the world as trending toward greater stability, which instead has reversed course since then given the current Ukraine-Russia situation, continued North Korean provocations, and increasingly aggressive Chinese foreign policy against regional neighbors (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2012, iii). This reinforces what is already well known; it is impossible to predict what the future holds, and where next the U.S. military might need to deploy and conduct operations. The most recent *Quadrennial Defense Review* acknowledges this rapidly changing nature of the 21st century security environment and the challenges it presents (Department of Defense 2014). Accordingly, the *Joint Force Capstone Concept* lists deterring aggression and

providing a stabilizing presence as two of the 10 identified primary missions for the joint force heading into the year 2020. These two missions are those that are typically conducted during phases 0, I or V of the six-phase joint operations planning model.

According to the current *National Security Strategy*, a major aspect of it is to develop and strengthen our regional partnerships through increased engagement and building partner capacity (U.S. President 2010). It further states we will continue strengthening our capacity to partner with foreign counterparts, train and assist security forces, and pursue military-to-military ties with a broad range of governments. Although four years old at the time of this writing, the framework still shapes the national policies below it. Subsequently, increasing engagement, building relationships, and developing new strategic partnerships around the world are also a reoccurring themes in the *Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, The National Military Strategy of the United States, and Army Strategic Planning Guidance*, among others (Department of Defense 2012; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 2011; Department of the Army 2013b). Whether this strategy can actually be fully pursued or not, between budgetary headwinds and intermittent domestic pressure to pull back inward instead, is another subject. However, engagement is even specified as a cornerstone of the Department of Defense (DoD) Arctic strategy in response to climate change effects, working together with Canada and the other Arctic nations of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, and Sweden. This includes engaging in more multilateral training opportunities with partners in the region to enhance cold-weather operational experience, and strengthening of military-to-military ties (Hagel 2013). These tie together with the *Joint Force Capstone Concept* emphasis on Joint Force partnering for globally integrated

operations. It further states that Joint Forces must be able to integrate effectively with U.S. governmental agencies, partner militaries, and indigenous and regional stakeholders. This integration must be scalable, ranging from the ability of an individual unit to enroll the expertise of a nongovernmental partner to multi-nation coalition operations. This is the strategic-level context for the thesis subject.

Specifically for the Army to be better prepared for deploying into foreign operating environments, it has organized regionally-aligned forces (RAF) designed to provide to the combatant commander a force with enhanced understanding of the cultures, geography, languages, and militaries of the countries where they are likely to be employed, and an ability to impart military knowledge and skills to others (Department of the Army 2013b, 6). They will also routinely be used to defend national interests by conducting civil-military operations and security cooperation operations (Department of the Army 2014, 5) with regional partners around the world. Security cooperation activities during steady-state phase 0 shape operations will be people-centric missions that require building trust and sharing experiences, and will require Army forces to operate in and around the culture and politics of host nation populations. However, experience from recent conflicts has shown the need for more culturally-adept personnel when operating in foreign cultures (Ibrahimov 2008, 248; Department of the Army 2009, ii). Conflicts of the past decade have put Soldiers into foreign operating environments in which they must be able to interact with and influence members of other cultures in order to be successful at their missions. The Strategic Landpower Task Force notes that time the United States has repeatedly engaged in conflict without fully considering the physical, cultural, and social environments that comprise what some have called the

“human domain” (2013, 2). The RAF will be expected to do exactly that, to operate effectively in their assigned regions, which will realistically consist of many different cultures through a vast geographic combatant command area of responsibility. The cultural diversity of the U.S. Africa Command area of responsibility is extensive, as it is for U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. Southern Command, and all of the other remaining command areas of responsibility. The cultural capability requirements for RAF, in support of the global engagement strategy and steady state regional security cooperation, are significant, and probably not fully appreciated by the total force.

The defense intelligence, behavioral, and social science communities acknowledge shortfalls in cross-cultural capabilities. The paper “Operational Relevance of Behavioral & Social Science to DoD Missions” reports that today’s military provides rudimentary training about social mores and customs in an attempt to provide basic knowledge and judgment about how to interact at the tactical level. While this training may prevent an embarrassing gaffe, or worse, during interactions with the local populace, it has no impact on operational and strategic understanding of the operating environment (Flynn et al. 2013, 14).

Even the U.S. House Armed Services Committee has weighed in on the issue, reporting that the description of cultural skills by the services as enablers still falls short of treating them as a core competency essential to the Department’s missions. They recommend that the services’ policies should recognize language skills, cultural awareness, and regional expertise as core competencies on the same level as traditional combat skills (U.S. Congress 2010, 37).

The changing nature of warfare emphasizes the need to develop a deeper understanding of the human perspective. Conflict is emerging in diverse corners of the world, and the DoD needs to develop the expertise in each of these regions (Flynn et al. 2013). Unfortunately, though, the DoD's history of predicting the next conflict is especially poor. The challenge to develop expertise in every region of the world from where conflict might erupt is unrealistic, especially considering the current and forecast resource-constrained environment from which the U.S military must develop their capabilities.

The previous *Quadrennial Defense Review* ascribed an equally daunting challenge, reporting that the operating environment demands a much greater degree of language and regional expertise requiring years, not weeks, of training and education, as well as a greater understanding of the factors that drive social change (Department of Defense 2010, 29). [Note: the 2014 QDR was published late in the writing of this paper] The Flynn et al. paper also argues that consideration should be given to the recruitment of social scientists as integrated members of the command staff. Commanders and staffs must gain better understanding of the human environment in order to shape it in phases 0-5 (2013, 14). The outcome of many recent conflicts have shown that perception of success is important, but is also relative to position, and the United States is increasingly needing to compete for influence over others key to the end state of the conflict.

Most discussion and proposals to build Cross-Cultural Competence (3C) for U.S. forces continues to center around expanding language skills and regional knowledge, or greater use of cultural experts or consultants in a special staff position to advise commanders and planners (Bledsoe 2005; Bados et al. 2010; Hernandez 2007). The latter

capabilities are valid requirements, but the point of the spear for human interaction in military operations remains the Soldier on the ground. While social scientists, such as Human Terrain Systems, have a valuable role in providing context and understanding the human factors aspect of the operating environment to planners and commanders, it is not realistic to have them available everywhere, or at every level, where the military is deployed and conducting operations. This would be especially true regarding low-level small-scale engagements by junior leaders, where 3C is most needed. This is, perhaps, a rationale to integrate their efforts institutionally across the doctrine, operations, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities construct, which is a separate subject.

Current doctrine (Department of the Army 2012d) does include culture as a consideration throughout the planning process, but the understanding of relevance and utilization needs strengthened. Relevant culture is not just language and culture-specific data and facts (e.g. demographics and economics), but lends to understanding of how local culture influences behaviors and decision-making of the local populace, whether friendly and hostile. It is apparent that a more generalizable and transferable cultural capability is required, where leaders are able to adapt beyond a limited region of interest to any cultural environment, and able to interact across cultural differences with diverse partners in appropriate ways which support mission accomplishment.

The strategic way forward indicates a 3C capability is required across the force. However, can the average leader in a RAF know what being 3C means? This paper will conduct analysis of what the DoD and Army, as well as the social sciences and private sector can offer with regard to understanding 3C for an Army leader. The DoD and Army

have language and culture strategies in place, which this paper will therefore also review as part of analysis of the 3C requirement.

This paper is focused on Army leaders, discussing them in the general sense as officers, who will be those most likely to be conducting key leader engagements or operations planning in which an adequate level of cultural competence will be required (Bados et al. 2010, 8). This study will attempt to answer if it is more important to learn language and culture-specific knowledge, or to develop an adaptable framework of cultural understanding, in order to be most capable of successfully operating in a foreign environment for an Army leader assigned to a regionally-aligned force. To fully answer the larger problem, other supporting questions will need to be answered also. What makes individuals 3C and able to be effective operating across other cultures? What is an individual cultural capability? The goal is to gain better understanding and potentially a path forward on how to provide culturally-adept Army leaders required for U.S. strategy. The Army RAF aspect will be the context to guide the research, but a culturally-adept total force may end up being what is required for the future.

## CHAPTER 2

### LITERATURE REVIEW

War remains fundamentally a human endeavor that will require human solutions.  
— General James N. Mattis, USMC, *Small Wars Journal*

There are many definitions of culture, adaptability, and what comprises 3C, depending on the discipline of study, and even between the military services. The first step is to define culture in order to gain baseline understanding of the sociological paradigm central to the thesis topic before looking at competence. Arguing for a specific definition of culture is not among the goals of this thesis, but a short discussion about the various definitions of culture will well serve as a starting point to the subject of 3C.

Salmoni and Holmes-Eber define culture as the shared worldview and social structures of a group of people that influence a person's and a group's actions and choices (2008, 36). They argue that culture for military people is useful only if they can render it operationally relevant. This paper will consider that precept during later analysis and discussion. Another definition says culture is the collective programming of the mind distinguishing the members of one group or category of people from others (Hofstede 2014). The Army Culture and Foreign Language Strategy (ACFLS) defines it as the set of distinctive features of a society or group, including but not limited to values, beliefs, and norms, that ties together members of that society or group and that drives action and behavior (Department of the Army 2009, 7). Joint doctrine describes culture as habitual and perceived as natural by people within the society, which conditions an individual's range of action and ideas; influences how people make judgments about what is right, wrong, important, or unimportant; and dictates how members of a society are likely to

perceive and adapt to changing circumstances. Where social structure comprises the relationships within a society, culture provides meaning within the society (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2009, IV-4). Culture is a broad topic and can have other definitions. The variances between these different definitions are not significant, and those covered should suffice to provide the reader the necessary understanding of culture schema.

The next step is to review what existing literature says about 3C. There are several questions to consider. Is it having cultural awareness? Is it language skills? Is it regional or country-specific knowledge? Is it personality? Is there a generic cultural framework or code that can be applied to all cultures?

**Language Skills:** A lot of discussion pertaining to 3C emphasizes foreign language skills (Hernandez 2007; Connable 2009; Watson 2014). The DoD Strategic Plan for Language Skills, Regional Expertise, and Cultural Capabilities (2011) and ACFLS (2009) focuses heavily on acquiring foreign language skills for select personnel in low-density positions or specialty units. The ability to verbally communicate across cultures is certainly important, but can it be determined to what degree it contributes to intercultural effectiveness? New Army doctrine also says that with regard to expectation of operating in many different environments worldwide, leaders will need to become multilingual and study the cultures and histories of other regions of interest (Department of the Army 2012f, 9-2).

**Regional and Country-Specific Knowledge:** Region-specific training provides descriptive facts and figures about a locale. It typically conveys demographics and history regarding the various subgroups in a particular region, shared values of the population, a generalized description of the predominant belief system, and may include a

list of do's and don'ts based on norms. It is noted by Abbe and Halpin that the knowledge may not readily transfer to other nations or geographic locations though (2009-10, 21). Regional expertise is also sometimes termed regional competence.

A position paper from the Center for Languages, Cultures, & Regional Studies at the U.S. Military Academy, in discussing regional expertise as being key to understanding culture and language, provides an overly complicated definition of regional expertise, with the questionable rationale that regional systems are also complicated: "Regional expertise consists of geographically referenced and logically synthesized physiographic and socioeconomic information from five fundamental natural spheres (lithosphere, pedosphere, atmosphere, hydrosphere, biosphere) and diverse human sphere that includes socio-economic subsystems such as industrial development, agriculture, manufacturing, service and human psycho-behavioral qualities including culture, religion and politics. The purpose of regional expertise is to identify, determine, describe, analyze, and synthesize diverse spatial systems and their individual characteristics. In addition, regional knowledge is always place specific. Therefore, regional expertise also includes the delineation of quasi-homogeneous spatial entities as unique non-repeating individual regions or as repeating general patterns that capture and explain the diversity of natural and human phenomena. The ability to synthesize natural, cultural and social, economic and behavioral aspects is the desirable outcome in developing regional knowledge systems and spatial models" (Siska 2014). The usefulness of this description to the average military service member seeking to develop regional expertise is less than practical.

A related, and more accessible description comes from the Defense Language and National Security Education Office and Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute: “Cultural knowledge is defined as the ability to acquire factual knowledge about a country/region's past and current (a) social, political, and military structure, (b) economy, (c) belief system, and (d) national security situations in order to apply the cultural knowledge to planning and make sense of inconsistent information about social rules and norms” (DLNSEO and DEOMI 2013).

Combination of Language and Regional Knowledge: One proposed model from a military publication consists of a three-step approach for a combination of language training, history and culture education, and practical application in order to achieve greater cultural understanding than current training approaches (Hernandez 2007). This method would require years of study of various targeted regions of interest to move beyond cultural awareness to expertise, which is not practical for a global force to achieve in the necessary depth and breadth.

Cultural Intelligence: Chin and Gaynier introduce cultural intelligence as encompassing both intelligence quotient and emotional intelligence, and entails the capacity to decipher, interpret, and integrate both rational and emotional behaviors. Leaders with high cultural intelligence are able to adapt to new global environments as well as effectively interact with people of diverse cultures (Chin and Gaynier 2006). Cultural intelligence reflects a capability to gather and manipulate information, draw inferences, and enact behaviors in response to one's cultural setting. In order to be culturally adaptive, there is a set of core cultural competencies that leaders must master. Adaptation requires skills and capabilities, which include cognition, motivation, and

behavior. All three of these facets acting in concert are required for high cultural intelligence: cognitive knowledge—the possession of wide-ranging information base about a variety of people and their cultural customs; motivation (healthy self-efficacy, persistence, goals, value questioning and integration); and behavioral adaptability—the capacity to interact in a wide range of situations, environments and diverse groups (Chin and Gaynier 2006).

McDonald et al. (2008) proposed a model of concentric circles, also known as the “3C Bulls-Eye,” that depicts how 3C permeates different levels, beginning with self and expanding outward, ultimately to the adversary. They posit that the acquisition of 3C begins with the self by understanding one’s own beliefs, values, and biases to better appreciate other cultural identities. Bados et al. (2010) adapt Bloom’s taxonomy as a cognitive hierarchy for the way culture progresses from awareness, to understanding (knowing the whats of culture), and then to competence, where culture is operationalized (knowing how to use). Conceptual models are a helpful approach to learn about basic cultural schema, but can not go much further for actual achievement of 3C. To be useable, it is necessary to move to empirical models and then application as early as possible.

Molinsky’s model (2013) of six dimensions of cultural code, which are used to ask diagnostic questions pertaining to: directness, enthusiasm, formality, assertiveness, self-promotion, and personal disclosure. These are used to determine how to conduct oneself within the respective foreign culture. Hofstede (2014) also has a model of cultural dimensions consisting of: power distance index (higher means more dependence on bosses), individualism index (higher means more individualistic), masculinity index (higher means more masculine with clear gender roles), uncertainty avoidance index

(higher means members threatened by ambiguity), and long-term orientation (higher means focus on perseverance and thrift). Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner's cultural dimensions (1997), developed for application to general business and management, consist of universalism versus particularism, individualism versus collectivism, achievement versus ascription, neutral versus affective, specific versus diffuse, internal versus external, and time orientation. While not the primary focus of this paper, the dimensional approach to culture is further explored in chapter 4.

Army behavioral science defines 3C as individual capability that contributes to intercultural effectiveness regardless of the particular intersection of cultures (Abbe et al. 2007, 2). This refers to the knowledge, affect/motivation, and skills that enable individuals to adapt effectively in cross-cultural environments. This comes from a general framework for 3C in Army leaders consisting of three overlapping components of language, regional competence, and 3C necessary for intercultural effectiveness (figure 1). The 3C provides culture-general capability, and regional/cultural expertise and language proficiency provide culture-specific capability. “In contrast to region-specific training, culture-general training and education teach about culture in general, rather than a particular culture. This approach identifies dimensions on which cultures may vary, providing a framework to consider cultural similarities and differences” (Abbe and Halpin 2009-10, 22).




Figure 1. A General Framework for 3C in Army Leaders

*Source:* Allison Abbe, Lisa M.V.Gulick, and Jeffrey L. Herman, "Cross-Cultural Competence in Army Leaders: A Conceptual and Empirical Foundation (Study report, U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, Fort Belvoir, VA, 2007), 2.

This model has been generally used in subsequent studies in and outside of the Army Research Institute, and is used as the foundation model for this research paper. Other papers which delve deeper into the 3C component refer to knowledge, skills, attitudes, and abilities (McCloskey et al. 2010). While still using the same overall framework, this paper will use knowledge, skills, attributes, and affect/motivation (KSAA). The culture-general component has been further shortened to just KSA in some literature, and this paper will do the same for ease of use. As such, it is important to understand what KSA are before discussing them in further detail in the analysis.

**Knowledge:** Knowledge begins with an awareness of one's own culture and includes a complex understanding of culture and cultural differences (Abbe and Halpin 2010). Knowing and understanding cultural schema/paradigm (culture and components of), cultural self-awareness (in order to better understand the differences and similarities of the other specific culture) is necessary as a foundation to develop 3C. Knowledge also includes cognitive complexity specifically problem-solving and learning capability.

**Skills:** This refers to various interpersonal skills. Skill describes a present, observable competence to perform a learned act (could be motor, psycho-motor, and/or cognitive) (McCloskey et al. 2010). Skills encompass the ability to regulate one's own reactions in a cross-cultural setting, interpersonal skills, and the flexibility to assume the perspective of someone from a different culture (Abbe and Halpin 2010).

**Attributes:** Attributes are a quality or characteristic given to a person, group, or some other thing (Collins 2014). Attributes can be cognitive, behavioral, or affective in nature. In keeping with use of the Abbe et al. (2007) framework as foundation for this thesis though, affective attributes are broken out separately.

**Affect/Motivation:** Generally speaking, this is one's disposition, attitude, and willingness to engage with others. Affect includes attitudes toward foreign cultures and the motivation to learn about and engage with them (Abbe and Halpin 2010). Affect is the emotional response to cultures and cultural differences, including attitudes, preferences, and motivation (Department of the Army 2009). Attitude describes an internal state that influences an individual's choices or decisions to act in a certain way under particular circumstances (McCloskey et al. 2010).

Of note, precision of words is important for this subject, but some terms will be used interchangeably. For the purposes of this paper, the term 3C will be used primarily, but also used interchangeably with the term Intercultural Competence when fitting to the discussion or citing a study where the specific term is used. However, those two terms should be understood as distinct from the more specific terms culture-general and culture-specific knowledge, or cultural capability. In addition, encounter and interaction will have same meaning and be used interchangeably, whether referring to individuals and groups. Another term pertaining to outcomes of cross-cultural encounters or interactions is intercultural effectiveness. The usage of the term intercultural effectiveness is more than personal adjustment to living in a foreign culture, but also the ability to communicate across cultures (not specifically referring to foreign language proficiency), establishing and maintaining interpersonal relationships, successful work outcomes, and for military personnel, the ability to exert influence across cultural boundaries (Abbe et al. 2007, 1; Abbe 2008). Some of the research material for this thesis came from empirical studies of multinational business managers, expatriates, Peace Corps volunteers, and study-abroad students regarding their intercultural effectiveness, versus returning early or unsuccessful work outcomes. Other research review included results of empirical studies conducted on military personnel that had high-contact encounters with local populations, such as military transition teams, security force assistance teams, civil affairs, military police, and special operations forces, whose deployment experiences were not limited to the Middle East and whose missions varied across the range of military operations.

The competence analysis conducted by McCloskey et al. (2010) examined how 3C develops in Soldiers, and how that competence supports mission success. They found 28 KSAs that impacted 3C, which was developed into a mission-centric model of 3C. The cognitive grouping included perspective-taking, anticipate/predict, awareness of cultural differences, diagnose nature of resistance, big picture mentality, self-awareness/self-monitoring, interpretation, observation, frame shifting, and planning. The affective/attitude grouping included cultural openness, open-mindedness, willingness to engage, emotional empathy, dedication (going above and beyond), self/emotional regulation, withhold on closure, patience, tolerance for ambiguity, emotional endurance, self-efficacy, and resilience. The behavioral grouping included self-presentation, relationship-building, rapport building, manipulate/persuade, flexibility, communication skills, and leveraging own personality attributes.

Zbylut and Metcalf et al. (2009) conducted an empirical study with Army and Marine personnel post-deployment and analyzed use of KSAs relating to various tasks relating to advising (2009). They developed 42 KSAs as relevant to the performance and success of the personnel conducting those missions.

Caligiuri and Tarique found a combined effect of personality characteristics (extraversion, openness to experience, and lower neuroticism) and cross-cultural experiences (organization-initiated work experiences and non-work cross-cultural experiences) as predictors of dynamic cross-cultural competencies (tolerance of ambiguity, cultural flexibility, and reduced ethnocentrism) (2012). Their empirical study of expatriate business professionals, study-abroad students, international volunteers, and intergovernmental and non-government organizational workers showed the extroversion

and openness to experience were most significantly related to cross-cultural competencies.

Of note, other factors from the literature which pertain to 3C include such antecedent variables of prior international experience, (multi-) cultural self-identity, and other biographical aspects (Abbe et al. 2007). Those are deliberately not discussed in this paper as part of limiting the scope of study.

A review of current DoD and Army culture and foreign language strategies finds they still focus mostly on development of foreign language and regional competence (Department of Defense 2011a; Department of the Army 2009). Each of the military services have well-developed programs for those competencies already in place, which are planned for growth in limited ways. The ACFLS uses framework models and conceptual discussion of how to generate a force with the appropriate levels of proficiency and characterizes development of cultural capability as the main effort, with development of language capability as the supporting effort. The ACFLS breaks down 3C into components of culture fundamentals, culture self-awareness, and culture skills. These components plus regional competence comprise an individual culture capability (Department of the Army 2009, 30-32). The ACFLS does address the 3C KSA aspect when defining cultural capability, in describing it as the blend of individual competence in understanding general characteristics of culture and the characteristics of specific cultures, derived from a cumulative set of cultural knowledge, skills, and attributes, to help forecast and favorably influence the behavior of the target group of society and accomplish assigned tasks. It also includes the ability to apply that competence to the

planning of operations and interactions with individuals having different cultural backgrounds as part of cultural capability (Department of the Army 2009, 9-10).

## CHAPTER 3

### RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The subject of 3C is very broad and deep, and the study of it crosses various disciplines. Research material was taken from various sources within defense, military, other government sectors, and private sector sources such as the multinational business field. These were generally published papers that studied intercultural effectiveness through various methods and from different approaches, but each still seeking to determine the competencies and factors that contributed to success, and also what detracted from it.

The primary research question is: what makes somebody cross-culturally competent (3C)? The research for this primary question started with a review of scientific studies, white papers, topical books, and articles on the subject. As the literature review progressed, the secondary research questions were developed: what is the relevance to national strategy and RAF? What is a cultural capability? What is the relationship between 3C and leadership? How can an Army leader become 3C? What is the relevance of the DoD and Army language and culture strategies? What is the applicability to the human domain concept and Engagement warfighting function?

Early into the research, it was necessary to define the various terms encountered. In different instances, there were academic terms and common usage terms which were utilized selectively in order to make the paper accessible. The literature review included examination of relevant military culture and foreign language strategies and doctrine which had bearing to the research questions.

The analysis methodology was to cross-reference those against the behavioral and social science literature for relevance, as well as assessing the relationship and application to Army leadership doctrine and U.S. national strategies, using the RAF framework as context. Because the Army has well-developed programs to build foreign language capability and regional/culture-specific knowledge to the force, the thesis primarily focused on culture-general KSAs, using Abbe et al. (2007) 3C framework as a foundation. Specifically, it analyzed the personality attributes which comprise a culture-general capability and the relationship between those attributes and current Army leadership attributes. It also then assessed how the resulting findings meet the requirements of Army and DoD strategies. The thesis then went a step further to theorize how 3C fit with the human domain concept and could be operationalized.

Due to available time and resource limitations, the author was unable to directly conduct any original qualitative or empirical studies of how KSAs contribute or enable 3C. The main challenge to completion of the work was to maintain a limited focus on a specific aspect of 3C because it is a broad and deep subject that can be studied ad nauseam. The thesis seeks to produce findings that are relevant and usable for readers in both the academic and research fields, and those in the operational force. It also seeks to contribute to the evolution of the various concepts discussed, and influence advancement of those ideas into practical application.

## CHAPTER 4

### ANALYSIS

Those who can win a war well can rarely make a good peace, and those who could make a good peace would have never won the war.

— Winston Churchill, *My Early Life*

#### 3C KSAs

There is considerable material available regarding contribution of KSAs to 3C.

Many articles and books have been written on the subject as far back as Dutch and British colonial period. Using prevalence and potential relevance to Army leaders and RAF was a subjective approach to narrowing the focus of the analysis. Chapter 2 already discussed the knowledge element of KSA. It is necessary to have knowledge of cultural schema, and an understanding of one's own cultural self-identity. Someone who is fully aware of their own culture and how it influences them can better recognize the parts of foreign cultures and how it influences the peoples within that culture. However, this is just a starting point. 3C, or the ability to rapidly adapt to different cultural environments without extensive prior knowledge of the region, is a key attribute that today's leaders need in order to succeed (McCloskey et al. 2010). Discussion of 3C KSAs includes not just those that significantly contributed to intercultural effectiveness, but also those that significantly detracted from it. Research shows the following specific KSAs have a marked effect on intercultural effectiveness.

Open-mindedness: Open-mindedness is the ability to withhold personal or moral judgment when faced with novel experiences, knowledge and points of view (McCloskey et al. 2010, 15). Individuals high on openness to experience are more likely to retain and

reproduce learned skills and behaviors. Openness to experience allows individuals to seek new experiences and learn about new cultures from other people, which facilitates interpersonal interactions which are important to retain and reproduce learned skills and behaviors (Caligiuri and Tarique 2012). These definitions seem to be related to the term cultural openness used in other material

**Self-efficacy:** Self-efficacy is belief in one's capabilities to organize and execute the courses of action required to produce given attainments, which can be manifested by persistence to overcoming obstacles (Abbe et al. 2007), or belief in one's capabilities to mobilize the motivation, cognitive resources, and courses of action needed to meet situational demands (McCloskey et al. 2010). This attribute is related to confidence, and facilitates motivation and willingness to engage others, which can be separate KSAs supportive of intercultural effectiveness themselves.

**Perspective-taking Skills:** Perspective-taking skills are a set of competencies that enable individuals to make sense of and understand other individual's perspectives or understandings of situations (Rentsch et al. 2007). In other words, it is recognizing and understanding other's points of view. Abbe et al. (2007) used the definition of perspective-taking as the ability to see events as another person sees them. It is associated with empathy, usually cognitive empathy. It may not necessarily include emotional empathy, which is the ability to feel as another person feels (Abbe et al. 2007). However, emotional empathy may be a necessary precursor to cognitive empathy, according to McCloskey et al. (2010). The DoD 3C website specifically defines cultural perspective-taking as the ability to detect, analyze, and consider one's own and others' cultural assumptions, values and biases, and cultural context in order to recognize how others will

interpret his/her own actions (DLNSEO and DEOMI 2013). It is important to note that understanding the other perspective is useful, but does not require having to agree with that perspective.

Interpersonal Skills: The strongest predictor for intercultural effectiveness found was interpersonal skills (Abbe 2008). These consist of sets of skills to effectively communicate an ability to establish and maintain relationships (Abbe and Halpin 2010). Also skills of interpersonal tact, listening, relationship-building, rapport-building (i.e. bonding and likeableness), and attributes of conscientiousness, flexibility, and agreeableness come from more in-depth study of interpersonal skills, and are defined in more detail (McCloskey et al. 2010). The multitude of various interpersonal skills, along with various (sub-) skills have been studied separately to a degree unable to be covered in this paper.

Extroversion: Extroversion is the degree which individuals are sociable, talkative, and seek social activities. Extroverts have the need to engage in social activities and a strong learning orientation, which affect interpersonal interactions in ways that are important to retain and reproduce learned skills and behaviors (Caligiuri and Tarique 2012). Psychology describes it as the act of directing one's interest outward or to things outside the self, which is characterized by sociability, assertiveness, emotional expressiveness, and excitability (Collins 2014).

Self-monitoring: Self-monitoring is an individual's motivation and ability to observe and adjust his/her behavior in a socially acceptable way depending on situational cues (Abbe et al. 2007). Self-monitoring provides a mechanism for learning from others who are skilled at adapting their behavior across cultures.

So far, these KSAs describe somebody who could generally be considered outgoing and personable. This should not be a major surprise that a highly personable and engaging person would be successful interacting across cultures. These studies and others sufficiently back that thought, and provide specificity to the precise elements of personality which comprise that ability. However, there were also some other less obvious, and more interesting 3C KSAs which merit further discussion though.

**Need for Closure:** The need for closure is the motivation to find immediate answers and solutions and to resist any new information that conflicts with those answers (Abbe et al. 2007). In foreign cultures, those with lower need for closure function better than those with higher need for closure.

**Tolerance for Ambiguity:** Tolerance for ambiguity is the disposition of being able to react to new and uncertain situations with minimal discomfort (Abbe et al. 2007). Generally speaking higher tolerance is better, as it minimizes potential for culture shock and facilitates personal adjustment.

**Self-regulation:** Self-regulation is emotion regulation, stress management, and coping, which are necessary for personal adjustment (Abbe et al. 2007). The ability to regulate/control one's emotions and emotional expression to support mission performance (McCloskey et al. 2010). Self-regulation is the behavioral science term for what would commonly be described as emotional self-control or discipline. The other element of stress management could arguably be a separate KSA.

At this point, it might raise the question to some of what does the Army care about personality attributes? The Army only cares about, and should care about occupational specialty competence, technical and tactical proficiency, and warfighting

abilities, right? The introduction chapter addressed some of the strategic relevance of being 3C already. However, to begin to further answering questions regarding the relevance of knowing the specific KSAs more in-depth, consider the last and most interesting one to be discussed for now:

Ethnocentrism is most interesting of the predominant KSAs from the research. Ethnocentrism is an individual's nationalistic self-centeredness, the belief that those from other cultures are inferior, which causes individuals to interpret and evaluate other's behavior using their own standards and make little effort to modify their own behavior to suit host cultural values (Caligiuri and Tarique 2012). It is another strong predictor (Abbe 2008), but of the opposite desired outcome to intercultural encounters—lower is typically better. Ethnocentrism fits into the affect category of KSA, where attitude and motivation reside. Moderated ethnocentrism is a predictor for better outcomes from intercultural encounters. The preferred disposition and attitude for intercultural effectiveness is ethno-relativity. Colonel Thomas X. Hammes (2004) wrote, "Any nation that assumes it is inherently superior to another is setting itself up for disaster" in pointing out that negative attitudes, from national to individual, can function as barriers to intercultural effectiveness.

However, this KSA warrants further study before being too hasty in attempting to develop a less ethnocentric force. It could be argued that the Army relies on high ethnocentric attitude to serve a variety of useful purposes. Highly ethnocentric individuals would likely also be strongly patriotic to their nation, and so this can serve as motivation for service to country. Within the greater national population, it can be a driving factor to strengthen national will during times of foreign adversity. National will

is an important factor, as an element of power and national resolve, to achieving strategic goals. Within military units themselves, it can be utilized to foster esprit de corps, which is a factor of unit morale and important to a unit's mission readiness. Ethnocentrism is also an important element in the psychology of dehumanizing enemies, to facilitate warfighter forces being able to more easily kill them in combat. Within this discussion, it should be noted that the line blurs between ethnocentrism and nationalism. In addition, ethnocentrism does not function independently of other KSAs, as they all interrelate with each other. It would be interesting to see how ethnocentrism scores relative to ambiguity and open-mindedness KSAs, specifically for military personnel. This is recommended to be a subject for future research.

Aside from learning about and understanding the specific KSAs, the research has also provided a clear finding about the degree to which culture-general KSAs contribute to intercultural effectiveness. The literature conclusively shows culture-general KSAs are a greater indicator for intercultural effectiveness than either foreign language or regional expertise components.

The finding that the culture-general KSA component contributes more to intercultural effectiveness than language proficiency and regional competence is the first major conclusion of the paper. The discovery of this is an individual deduction from evidence in the literature, but is also found as a conclusion itself directly within various research literature sources by the respective authors (Abbe et al. 2007; Caligiuri and Tarique 2012; Chin et al. 2001; Crepeau et al. 2012; Silverthorne 2000). This should also not be construed to claim that foreign language and culture-specific/regional competence are not important or relevant to 3C. They remain important and greatly enhance the

effort, but individuals may have them and still fail at IC effectiveness if absent the necessary 3C KSAs. Various studies and anecdotal information suggest this can and has happened (Molinsky 2013). This is an issue that therefore will be further explored in this paper, as current cultural training in the Army primarily targets the other two knowledge components of 3C, with emphasis on culture-specific features of the operational environment.

While this paper focuses on those specific 3C KSAs just discussed, some research material provided much greater in-depth discussion of KSAs, down to very granular aspects of personality and character. The value of including any additional discussion at such level of detail to the average Army leader would probably be negligible. For the interested reader though, an overview of it is provided in order to understand the level of detail in which study of personality traits (KSAs) has been conducted. It is also useful for achieving greater understanding of relevance and potential use of this data for the purposes of developing a 3C total force.

The additional KSAs of note are best covered for the military reader by McCloskey et al. (2010), who developed descriptors of Soldier characteristics and performance for each of the four levels of competence in their model: pre-competent, foundation (novice), task-oriented, and mission-specific. These 28 KSAs were each mentioned in chapter 2, so this discussion will be limited to just provide the highlights of the study from component groups.

The most frequently occurring affective KSAs in this study were cultural openness and open-mindedness. Cultural openness is one's interest and drive to learn about new cultures and to gain new cross-cultural experiences. This term also relates to

motivation and willingness to engage KSAs because of the reference to one's drive. Perspective-taking was the most frequently occurring cognitive KSA, and emerged as a pervasive component of overall 3C. And of the behavioral KSAs, the most frequently occurring were self-presentation, relationship and rapport-building, and manipulation/persuasion, many of which relate to interpersonal skills (McCloskey et al. 2010).

Another study of note previously mentioned in chapter two was conducted by the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, and matched KSAs to the tasks and activities specific to the operational mission (Zbylut and Metcalf et al. 2009). They developed 42 KSAs categorized into cultural, relationship-building, influence, advisory, and other groupings. In the cultural category, the ability to compare one's culture with the counterpart culture, and skill at adopting the perspective of the counterpart received the highest ratings from the study participants. These directly relate to the earlier discussion of knowledge of cultural schema and cultural self-identity as prevalent KSAs supporting intercultural effectiveness. Also regarding the cultural KSAs, the ability to suppress one's cultural biases and the ability to judge counterpart actions using the counterpart's cultural standards also appear to be important to advisor effectiveness. Again, these are another form of the self-regulation and perspective-taking KSAs discussed.

With respect to the relationship-building category of KSAs, skill at conveying consideration and respect and skill at building rapport are essential advisor functions. These two skills were predictive of advisor reports of the counterpart's willingness to accept their advice. Advisors who reported having the most receptive counterparts were

those advisors who spent time building rapport, demonstrated consideration, and respect, engaged in behaviors to establish their credibility, and set a positive example.

The remaining groupings are less relevant to this paper's focus on 3C for Army leaders. However, the main value of this study is the direct relevance and specific applicability to the advising and influencing-oriented missions of various types (combat arms, combat service support, border, and police). The number of 42, or even 28 KSAs is excessive and cannot practically be used by Army leaders who are not behavioral science professionals, but contributes significantly to the study of how to develop 3C KSA specifically in military personnel. Many other studies and vast literature exists on relevance and importance of 3C KSA, and most discuss these same ones, by different terminology of the same meaning, and even broken down further into more granular or nuanced elements of personality characteristics and traits. They are too numerous to discuss here without writing a book, and would only provide negligible added value to a thesis goal of making 3C understandable and accessible.

### 3C and Adaptability

When talking about 3C KSAs, in layman's terms this is an individual's cultural adaptability, as mostly comprised of functional components of one's personality. The DoD 3C website describes cultural adaptability as the ability to integrate well with a variety of people and surroundings by adjusting behavior or appearance as necessary for situations that have different values, customs, and cultures, as well as adjusting one's own actions in order to maintain positive relationships with other groups (DLNSEO and DEOMI 2013). In their book *Operational Culture for the Warfighter*, Salmoni and Holmes-Eber described individual 3C as focused on the adaptability of person to a

culture (2008, 246). They differentiate it from operational culture, which is focused on the ways to understand, plan for, and operate in those cultures in which Marines may need to adapt. Both include adaptability as a core aspect in dealing with foreign culture, which needs further explored.

There is various other discussion of adaptability in literature pertaining to 3C and leadership. As noted in chapter 2, Chin and Gaynier's (2006) model of cultural intelligence includes behavioral adaptability as one of the three components. Raybourn's paper (2005) on adaptive thinking and leadership training for cultural awareness and communication competence uses the definition of adaptive thinking as consisting of competencies such as negotiation and consensus building skills, the ability to communicate effectively, analyze ambiguous situations, be self-aware, and think innovatively and critically. This is not a definition of adaptive thinking per se, but as noted within it, a set of supporting competencies. She notes though, that these competencies are essential elements of leader development training for special purpose forces, which are the military force traditionally known for cultural adaptability. Knowledge of a specific culture is useful to the leader operating within that culture, but even within a single country, individual regions are distinct in cultural makeup. It takes more than to just understand cultural differences, the challenge may be to actually change your own culturally ingrained behavior—adaptability, or global dexterity (Molinsky 2013). This requires more than mere cultural knowledge, it demands the capacity to act on what you know. Learning to adapt your behavior to function effectively in a particular situation in a foreign culture with expectations for behavior that are very different for

how people would typically act in that same situation in your native culture (Molinsky 2013).

Adaptability is where 3C and leadership intersect is the second major conclusion of this thesis. Silverthorne's research indicated a strong link between adaptability and effective leadership across cultures (2000). 3C plays a critical role in leadership functions, as it promotes effective cross-cultural interactions and leads to effective behavioral skills for communicating with other cultures, Leaders are commonly tasked to lead teams in a variety of missions, forcing them to meet operational needs and to perform effectively in cross-cultural environments. Thus, leaders must be able to successfully interact with others across cultures, reading intentions, building trust, and creating alliances, all while influencing individuals' motivations and actions (Laurence 2011). Chin and Gaynier use the Global Leadership Competency Model to show adaptability as the ideal high level of competence. Global leadership competency develops up through the pyramid model from ignorance at the base, progressing through stages of awareness, understanding, appreciation, acceptance, internalization, and finally, adaptation (2006). This is a descriptive model, rather than an empirical model, but can still be useful to conceptualize and understand how culture, adaptation, and global leadership intersect to form the highest levels of effectiveness. Beyond conceptual and descriptive modeling though, research shows that 3C leaders are highly effective leaders because of their adaptability. Successful culturally-competent global leaders understand how worldview and behavior are deeply influenced by cultural origin and how those differences can be bridged (Deardorff 2009). Cross-cultural competencies can help facilitate and expedite leader functions (Reid 2011). C3 prepares leaders with the

requisite skills needed for conflict resolution, communication, stress coping, language acquisition, tolerance for ambiguity, and the experience of living in other cultures (McDonald et al. 2008).

In the recent update of Army doctrine, adaptability was added as a principle for Army operations, along with five other new tenants (Department of the Army 2012a). Doctrine does not give it a definition, but discusses it as a requirement for Army leaders and how to utilize it as part of land operations. The requirement for adaptive Army leaders is also a key element of mission command as a philosophy (Department of the Army 2012b, 1). Army leadership doctrine discusses adaptability in the competency portion of the manual, not as an individual competency, but as a leadership tool and a quality (Department of the Army 2012e, 9-4). It says that leaders exhibit this quality through critical thinking, creative thinking, and displaying comfort with ambiguity, willingness to accept prudent risk, and ability to adjust rapidly while continuously assessing the situation. Adaptable leaders recognize that they face highly adaptive enemies and operate within dynamic, ever-changing environments. This fits the description from strategic assessments of the future operating environment for U.S. forces, which is really a continuation of the current operating environment. It continues further in saying that highly adaptable leaders are comfortable entering unfamiliar environments, and are comfortable with ambiguity. Adaptability has two key components: the ability to identify the essential elements critical for performance in each new situation, and the ability to change practices or the unit by quickly capitalizing on strengths and minimizing weaknesses.

The doctrine is helpful to understanding the requirement for adaptability as a leader attribute. Describing adaptability as a tool seems to be a mischaracterization of this trait though. It is certainly a necessary leader competency. Silverthorne (2000) says simply that leadership adaptability means that a leader must adapt his or her leadership style to suit the situation. Foreign cultures and military operations are unique and challenging situations by their nature. Leaders can use 3C to integrate, tolerate, and bridge differences that allow for congruent communication pathways and perspectives when executing military missions (Crepeau et al. 2012). This is applicable for the culture variations across the different operating environments, found even within single individual countries.

### Adaptive Leadership and 3C

Discussion of adaptable leadership warrants precise understanding of those terms as they are used by the military. The Army says leadership is the process of influencing people to accomplish the mission (Department of the Army 2012e, 1-1). This definition is useful adequate for this paper, as it will discuss the relationship between cross-cultural competency and influencing people (to accomplish the mission). As such, it is also useful to understand what is meant by influencing, with regard to the leadership process. The use of the term influence in Army leadership doctrine reflects the definition of common English usage “the act or power of producing an effect without apparent exertion of force or direct exercise of command” (Department of the Army, 2012d, iv). It further defines influencing as getting people—military and civilian, governmental and non-governmental partners, or even bystanders such as a local populace—to do what is required, in the context of it being a core process of leadership (Department of the Army 2012e, 1-1).

Interestingly, the ACFLS defines influence is the ability to shape others' attitudes and behavior through both direct and indirect approaches to include across cultural boundaries (Department of the Army 2009, 85). It is interesting to see the variation in just this limited look at the term. Regardless, any of these serve as an adequate definition for this discussion, as each supports the Army leadership process.

The previous discussion showed that 3C leaders are highly adaptive, which makes them more effective global leaders. Because the Army is a global force postured to conduct increased foreign engagement and partnering, this should indicate that 3C and adaptability are core leader attributes and competencies requirements. However, they are not. The Army leadership requirements model (figure 2) is meant to provide a common basis for thinking and learning about leadership and associated doctrine, and contains three groupings each of attributes and competencies. The attribute groupings (leader is) are character, presence, and intellect. The competency groupings (leader does) are leads, develops, and achieves. Army Doctrine Reference Publication 6-22, *Army Leadership*, Part II chapters 3-5 discusses the attributes portions of character, presence, and intellect in doctrine.




Figure 2. Army Leadership Requirements Model

Source: Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Reference Publication 6-22, *Army Leadership* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), 1-5.

However, in an attempt to make these more understandable and practical, it is probably better to look at the Army's new performance evaluation guide to guide the discussion. The leadership requirements model had already existed in Army leader doctrine, but the U.S. Army Performance Evaluation Guide (Center for Army Leadership 2014) was only recently published to facilitate use of the new Army officer evaluation report. It describes in greater detail the Army leadership requirements model attributes, along with a guide to how to observe them and evaluate them in a scale of four levels of performance from unsatisfactory to capable, proficient, and excels. When cross-

referenced against previously discussed KSAs of culture-general competence, four Army leader attributes match; empathy: discipline, confidence, and interpersonal tact.

According to the Army Performance Evaluation Guide (Center for Army Leadership 2014), empathy is the tendency to experience something from another person's point of view; the ability to identify with and enter into another person's feelings and emotions; and the desire to care for and take care of Soldiers and others. It also describes notionally how an Army leader would demonstrate empathy. Empathy is one of the prevalent attributes from the 3C KSA research. Research literature uses the term perspective-taking, and differentiates between cognitive and emotional perspective-taking.

From the same guide, discipline is control of one's own behavior according to Army Values; and mindset to obey and enforce good orderly practices in administrative, organizational, training, and operational duties. It again describes notionally how an Army leader would demonstrate discipline in their performance. Relating this attribute to 3C KSAs, discipline is also a form of self-regulation, which is another prevalent 3C KSA discussed earlier in chapter 4.

Confidence is projecting self-confidence and certainty in the unit's ability to succeed, and demonstrating composure and outward calm through control over one's emotions. Although using the term itself (as part of self-confidence) is not usually the best way to describe a term, this description relates confidence to self-efficacy and motivation KSAs. The latter part of the behavioral description also ties it with self-regulation, much like the discipline attribute. The guide's description of how it is

observed also applies more to self-regulation and stress management, whereas self-efficacy seems to be the more desired attribute in this context instead.

Last, interpersonal tact is the capacity to understand interactions with others; being aware of how others see you and sensing how to interact with them effectively; conscious of character, reactions and motives of self and others and how they affect interactions; and recognizing diversity and displaying self-control, balance, and stability, according to the guide. It is obviously related to the KSA interpersonal skills. It describes both as a behavior and how it is observed, the KSAs which would be termed self-monitoring and perspective-taking, using the lexicon from behavioral science used in this thesis.

While able to relate these four leader attribute to some 3C KSAs, they are collectively insufficient to address the necessary stand-alone leader requirement of 3C, which would be inclusive of being highly adaptive and effective at leading across cultures. Army leaders are also supposed to be developed to match the individual attributes found in the Army leadership requirements model, and had been evaluated on personal attributes in section 4 of the recently discontinued Officer Evaluation Report form. Therefore, this presents a shortfall in Army leadership doctrine. The new performance evaluation guide, which describes the attributes and how they are observed by a rater during subordinate's performance, also contains this gap. The only mention of adaptability is once, as a behavior supporting mental agility, and demonstrating the officer's intellect. Pounding (2010) argues that adaptability is important enough for it to be an individual knowledge point for Army leaders, incorporating 3C as one aspect of it.

Effective global leadership is what the Army seeks in order to meet the demands of being a global force. The Army had specifically cited the need to be able to operate with a global mindset and being culturally-adept as necessary qualities to be developed in all leaders in the previous *Army Leader Development Strategy* (Department of the Army 2009, 8). Similar language is used in the most recent *Army Leader Development Strategy*: “Leaders must be proficient in a variety of situations with a diverse set of national, allied, and indigenous partners” (Department of the Army 2013a, 5). All of the discussed studies come together and show that in order to be most effective, global leaders need strong adaptability and be 3C. The Chief of Staff of the Army has stated that his number one priority is developing adaptive leaders for a complex world (Odierno 2013, 2). It is a major gap that 3C is not a featured trait of the Army’s leadership requirements model.

The research has provided the information on the necessary KSAs, which then leads to the question of whether or they can be trained. The short answer is yes. Most 3C attributes are attainable through training and development (Chin and Gaynier 2006). However, any framework for culture learning must address the affective domain (Salmoni and Holmes-Eber 2008, 247). When broken down, 3C is mostly comprised of specific personality attributes. The Army trains for, and evaluates leader personality attributes as a matter of routine. The Army officer evaluation report (section 4a. character and 4b leader attributes/skills/actions) contains a section for supervisors to rate their subordinate’s strengths, which includes certain mental characteristics and attributes. For Army leaders, it is reasonable to suggest that they can increase their ability to self-regulate, attunement to their surroundings, proficiency in interpersonal skills, influencing others, and an understanding of the mindset of the people which they encounter

(Pounding 2010). Army leaders have been modifying their individual KSAs since they started their leader training pre-commissioning, and have done it throughout their military careers.

The Army is training some 3C KSAs as part of leader traits, but not as a direct application to intercultural effectiveness. Otherwise, all Army leaders would already be a highly culturally-adept group. The U.S. House Armed Services Committee has even been critical of the military services treating 3C as an enabler instead of a core competency (2010). Foreign language and regional expertise targeting the culture-specific knowledge component, is easy to measure and evaluate, 3C and KSAs are not readily found in training literature. The Army leader requirements model has some tangential KSA relevance as discussed, and those are trained and developed through general Army leader development and education.

The Training and Doctrine Command Culture Center developed a lesson module designed to enhance cross-cultural skills and select KSAs (self-regulation, perspective-taking, suspending judgment, empathy, and adaptability), among other cognitive skills (TRADOC Cultural Center 2012). The lesson module of the “Cultural Analysis – Cultural Understanding” class crosswalks 3C with the leader attributes of character, intellect, and presence in a way that redefines them to a cross-cultural context.

As applied to 3C, these attributes may be described as such: Army leaders must possess and model key attributes in order to reach their full professional potential. An attribute is defined as a characteristic unique to an individual that moderates how well learning and performance occurs. Leader development must build on the foundation of an individual’s existing qualities developing well-rounded leaders that possess three critical leadership attributes.

Character: Having character is to demonstrate a level of cultural awareness that includes a positive openness to other people, an understanding of prevailing values, beliefs, behaviors and customs, and a desire to learn more about cultures

and language. Building character requires: understanding one's self; the ability to assess cultural perspectives and values different from one's own; ability to compare differences and sensitivities in order to modify one's behavior, practices and language; operate in a multi-cultural environment; and apply cross-cultural communication skills.

Presence: With presence, a Soldier demonstrates communication, influence, and negotiation skills essential for leaders to effectively operate in a JIIM environment. A Soldier with presence employs skills to deal with ambiguous and complex situations, to regulate one's own behavior, and to use interpersonal abilities to deal with people from one's own or other cultures. This includes an understanding and ability to engage other joint and allied military personnel, and host country indigenous leaders with a moderate level of confidence.

Intellect: A Soldier with intellect demonstrates a familiarization in a geographic region of current operational significance. He/She leverages critical thinking and cognitive skills through organizing information that supports cultural self-awareness. The Soldier applies relevant planning considerations, terms, factors, concepts and geographic information to mission planning and in the conduct of operations. A Soldier of intellect can assess and describe the effect that culture has on military operations specific to countries or regions of operational significance to the U.S. (TRADOC Cultural Center 2012)

This descriptive 3C aspect of Army leader traits is highly useful for development of a junior leader preparing for a leadership position in a RAF facing deployment into a complex and cultural diverse operating environment. However, they are not articulated this way in any foundational leader development and education (LDE) doctrine taught in professional military education, nor in the current leadership requirements model descriptions discussed earlier. While these descriptions are usable in LDE, an assessment of the lesson material showed the remainder of it appeared to otherwise teach only cultural constructs, regional expertise (culture-specific information), and critical thinking skills.

Because adaptability is where 3C and leadership intersect, looking at how the Army trains the tool of adaptability may provide some insight on how to train 3C. The training units and developing leaders' doctrine says leaders improve their ability to adapt

through exposure to—and the intuition gained from—multiple, complex, and unexpected situations in challenging, unfamiliar, and uncomfortable conditions (Department of the Army 2012f). Of course, simple exposure to foreign cultures is not sufficient to develop 3C, otherwise all expats, deployed service members, Peace Corps volunteers, and such would have all succeeded in their intercultural experience. The necessary KSAs must already be present or developing. The *Army Leadership* ADRP 6-22 (2012d) better describes adaptability as including open-mindedness, ability to consider multiple perspectives, not jumping to conclusions about what a situation is or what it means, willingness to take risks, and being resilient to setbacks. Adaptive training involves variety, particularly in training that may have become routine. Leaders can be specialists, but their base of experience should still be broad. This is the same approach that the culture-general 3C framework provides to the culture aspect of the operational environment. Foreign language proficiency and regional expertise provide depth to operate in a specific culture; 3C provides leaders the breadth to operate in any culture (Abbe et al. 2008). Army leaders must be competent to operate across the globe, and interact with foreign individuals while simultaneously accomplishing their mission. The complex nature of military operations requires leaders to adapt to changing circumstances and dynamics, and new or changing requirements.

When determining what type of cultural capability needs to be developed, the objective should be adaptability as the primary capability (Abbe and Bortnick 2010, 20). The Army could potentially train 3C just like how it says to train adaptability; through varying the conditions in which a task is conducted, and then making the leader adapt accordingly. Army Doctrine Reference Publication 7-0 (2012e) says that while

individuals may not have trained on a specific task under specific conditions, they should have performed the task enough times under multiple conditions to confidently adapt to a new mission or environment. It is unclear how effective, or even if the Army trains their leaders this way. Pounding (2010) says the army does not adequately develop leader adaptability necessary for the nature of modern conflict. It could be a subject of research to determine if the Army is actually doing what the doctrine says about how to train adaptability, according to the description. Admittedly, a counter argument could be that the Army inherently trains adaptability via military lifestyle itself. Deployments, foreign engagements, and multinational exercises will force improvement of leader cultural competence, but there is only one chance to make a first impression to new strategic partners. Foreign experiences are most effective to learning only if they are modeled appropriately by the senior individuals leading the activities and there is meaningful interaction between peoples. In addition, having self-awareness of the requisite attributes can aid the participants, and self-monitoring can provide them with the ability to adapt when the inevitable friction points or faux pas is encountered.

Training 3C remains a considerable challenge, but it can be adapted into contemporary Army training paradigms. Service members must learn foundations of cross-culture at the earliest possible moment in their military training, in order to build upon it as they move up in rank and assume leader responsibilities. Crepeau et al. (2012) say training 3C using distributed learning can be effective, but Caligiuri and Tarique's research (2012) shows that experiential developmental experiences are most effective. Learning must involve opportunities to practice skills such as observation/being able to take behavioral cues from others, in order to demonstrate necessary behavioral

adaptation. Specifically, their empirical study demonstrated high-contact cross-cultural experiences could influence dynamic global leadership competencies and global leader effectiveness (Caligiuri and Tarique 2012). Molinsky notes that we all have the capability to modify our behaviors to the context (2013, 64). Significant intercultural experiences in both personal and professional lives enable individuals to learn the nuances of behavior that are expected in another culture compared to one's own—helping to understand one's own cultural values and assumptions. When sensitive to these characteristics, as well as to the norms of behavior in another culture, one begins to develop the intercultural competences important for success in global leadership, according to Caligiuri and Tarique (2012). Having knowledge of cultural schema and cultural self-awareness as a foundation helps facilitate this transference.

Regarding culture-specific regional competence, awareness of cultural differences is one competency that has been prominent (Behymer et al. 2010; Bledsoe 2005). This is important in order to avoid cultural missteps that could have damaging impact to the mission. However, it is also important to know and understand the areas of common ground upon which to build shared interest and leveraged further. Training focused on cultural differences may prove to be counterproductive for Army leaders, as influence and collaboration with members of other cultures tend to be enhanced by an understanding of similarities and shared identities, not by emphasizing differences. Finding ways to establish common ground, while acknowledging differences, is a helpful tool in establishing rapport and a first step toward building a relationship (Abbe and Halpin 2009-10). Molinsky (2013) also cautions about how cultural differences are portrayed in learning environments. In his book, he specifically describes them as

prototypical cultural differences, meaning the average or typical differences one would find within a population (xvi). These differences exist on average, but do not necessarily define how any particular individual person from a given culture will behave. This is an important distinction when discussing other cultures, such as when developing regional competence, in order to avoid developing stereotypes across an entire culture.

Interestingly, Chin and Gaynier discuss the Western tendency to pursue color-blindness, and describe it as misguided. Instead of seeking to just see people as people, the opposite may be true (2006). In other words, recognizing cultural differences is still important. In order to successfully navigate across cultures, it is necessary to recognize the differences, as well as similarities. A balanced approach must be used to develop appropriate understanding of a culture. Just as importantly, use of KSAs to convey respect for other culture (regardless of actual personal feelings) via ethno-relative perspective, open-mindedness, and willingness to engage further facilitates steps to achieve rapport-building and establishing trust.

Cultural considerations are an inherent part of the operating environment when deployed to a foreign nation. Much like counter-explosive tasks were incorporated into Army training, with particular emphasis for deploying units, cultural considerations can be further emphasized. This has already been done to some extent during pre-deployment collective training for units going to Southwest Asia. However, culture must be further integrated into training at all levels as part of routine conditions. Pre-deployment training often includes simulated environments in which the deployment will occur, such as an Afghanistan village or other terrain. While there may be variations of the conditions (using the training model of task-condition-standard), the focus is usually on how well

the training task is performed. Training on tasks is evaluated by task, condition, and standard. As adaptability for Army leaders is developed through varying the conditions in which a task is training, those conditions can be varied and evaluated to include different cultural considerations which may affect how the task is conducted. Training must incorporate cultural factors into the conditions portion of task training and trainer can assess. Obviously, not all 3C KSAs would be relevant in every situation.

But this does mean assessing somebody's behavioral attributes. Contrary to possible initial reaction, this does not require a behavioral psychologist. Army leaders assess KSAs all of the time when conducting leader development and evaluating subordinates. It also seems that some of these attributes could just be self-developed by the motivated leader. Being self-aware, and having knowledge and understanding the relevance of the other KSAs could go a long way toward 3C improvement.

Caligiuri et al. (2011), McCloskey et al. (2010), and Abbe and Bortnick (2010) contributed recent studies via the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences for training and assessing 3C specifically for military personnel. Each developed various frameworks and methods with some overlap, but more work is necessary in order for those proposals to become more feasible for implementation, and also more practical and usable by those who are not social science professionals. The four competence levels of pre-competent, foundation (novice), task-oriented, and mission-centric from McCloskey et al. (2010) are oriented toward Soldiers in foreign operating environments, while not user-friendly to training and developing 3C in the operating force, provides suitable material for lesson content on 3C KSAs for a Professional

Military Education environment. It, and the others cited, still significantly moves the study of 3C for military personnel forward.

The Army leader requirements model has some KSAs, which this paper has already discussed. This thesis has concluded that Army leadership doctrine needs updated to include 3C KSAs. Leadership doctrine is a natural fit for 3C KSAs and adaptability to be integrated. So then, this becomes a discussion less about training, but instead about LDE. It has been known that the DoD possesses the expertise for using behavioral and social science to help better understand the operating environment, but has yet to develop effective ways to make it available to commanders (Flynn et al. 2013, 14). This information and the expertise to develop the 3C KSA testing and evaluation methodology and standards for 3C are indeed resident within those types of organizations within the Army (Combined Arms Center-LDE, Center for Army Leadership, and U.S. Army Research Institute for Behavior and Social Sciences). The first step is to update the leadership requirements model and performance evaluation criteria to include 3C, adaptability, and associated attributes. The leadership development model (figure 3) clearly indicates a requirement of adaptation skills as a necessary leader competency, for which 3C is the adaptation to other cultures. This paper has discussed the intersection between 3C, adaptation, and leadership. They can be integrated into the Army performance evaluation guide as a vehicle for observing and evaluating the 3C KSAs. This will ensure it is understood and appreciated across the force. Unless there is such a change, 3C will remain a less important consideration for leader development and education.




Figure 3. Army Leader Development Model

*Source:* Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Army Leader and Development Strategy* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2013), 8.

The ACFLS is on target conceptually and based on the 3C science, but needs to be more specific and aggressive regarding implementation. The ACFLS definitions for cultural components and sub-components contain informed descriptions of 3C KSAs, along the lines discussed earlier in this chapter. It is encouraging that the ACFLS acknowledges the requirement for the force having a cultural capability beyond just language or regional knowledge. And the ACFLS description of cultural capability is a useful definition with an appropriate description of how to apply it. However, there does not seem to be common awareness of the existence of the ACFLS five years after publication and little evidence of any significant effect on 3C across the force. Many

parts are rather vague and the content of the responsibilities section is very generic. In terms of supporting the career development of 3C model given, the strategy framework is broad and abstract where a vision of practical implementation is needed. The advantage to teaching 3C as part of LDE is it provides the opportunity for experienced leaders to reflect upon their own experiences and self-evaluate individual strengths and weaknesses. It can improve self-awareness and understanding of in which ways they can further develop specific KSAs to become more 3C.

This paper does propose major changes to how the Army trains and develops leaders. However, it is impractical to propose a new team of trainers or class requirement to build, train or develop 3C in Army leaders, as many other papers of this type tend to do. This is especially the case during this time of smaller budgets and force downsizing. However, it is prudent to posit that the attributes and competencies receive necessary weight and focus within the Doctrine, Operations, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities construct, specifically doctrine and leadership. If having a force equipped with 3C capability is as important as described in the policies and strategies this paper discusses, and supports, then it must be weighted as a leader requirement as such. The CSA has made developing adaptive leaders for a complex world his top priority and the force must respond to support this need (Odierno 2013). 3C is an important competency for adaptable and effective Army leaders.

#### Operationalizing in Human Domain

Much of the recent discussion of 3C has been in the context of the counterinsurgency strategy. However, 3C is also relevant to the increased foreign contacts and interactions that will likely occur as part of the strategy for the future. The

RAF are designed to acquire language proficiency and region-specific knowledge for their aligned areas, but a division-sized RAF will still have limited effect given the enormity of area contained with each of the geographic combatant commands. Foreign language fluency and country-specific knowledge can still be less than effective at building relationships across cultures and influencing them to our terms of mission success. This is because cross-cultural encounters occur within the human domain and are subject to the human mental and emotional influences and barriers of the participants.

The human factor of conflict has continued to develop as a doctrinal concept since 2006 when Training and Doctrine Command directed a study of the human dimension (Department of the Army 2008; Chandler 2010). The human dimension concept focuses on the U.S. Army Soldier, but the human domain concept is broader. Human domain is the totality of the physical, cultural, psychological, and social environments that influence human behavior to the extent that success of any military operation or campaign depends on the application of unique capabilities that are designed to influence, fight, and win in population-centric conflicts (Department of the Army 2014b). This paper does not examine the concept of human domain critically, but it is helpful to understand it in order to provide the necessary context for further discussion of the relevance and application of 3C KSAs.

The concept of the human domain aspect seems to come from greater understanding that the military cannot exclusively rely on superior firepower and technology alone to secure victory, as the recent conflicts seemed to indicate. Army leaders must be capable of operating effectively within the human domain, which by its very nature is complex and likely to be foreign, in order to shape the operating

environment to a position of relative advantage in future conflicts, and in support of a strategy of engagement and building partnership. This is especially in population-centric conflicts such as insurgencies, where winning the peace may be more difficult than defeating the enemy. In addition, recent conflicts show that perceptions of victory or defeat are increasingly as important as the result on the ground. The doctrine of mission command accounts for this human factor in a description of military operations. “Military operations are complex, human endeavors characterized by the continuous, mutual adaptation of give and take, moves, and countermoves among all participants. Such a dynamic also includes civilian groups whose desires influence and are influenced by military operations” (Department of the Army 2012b, 1-1).

Consideration of the human domain aspect is pertinent to how to operationalize 3C KSAs. Previous discussion of operational culture earlier in this chapter pertained to how it is used with regard to adaptation. The same literature describes operational culture itself as those aspects of culture that influence the outcome of a military operation; and conversely also the military actions that influence the culture of an area of operations (Salmoni and Holmes-Eber 2008, 44). This description aligns with conceptualizing how to operationalize 3C KSAs.

This paper posits that within the human domain, 3C is operationalized when Army leaders use these KSAs (aided by language and regional expertise) during intercultural encounters to successfully influence others to do what is necessary in order to achieve mission success. This occurs when an Army leader is able to actively modify their behaviors, thought patterns, and affect when interacting across cultures in a manner that influences others in order to achieve the mission or objective. To preclude

misunderstanding or mischaracterization, this concept is not referring to using Jedi mind tricks or mind-reading skills, although it does come from the applied psychology discipline. However, it is rather a discussion of the very real aspects of an individual's own knowledge, personality attributes, and attitude, and how those things affect people as human beings during the course of interacting with others in a foreign culture, and how they affect the effectiveness of those encounters and impact mission success, whether tactical or strategic. The output of the operationalizing is especially important for Army leaders, because influencing others to accomplish the mission is, as discussed, the Army's doctrinal definition of leadership. It should be noted that influencing is not limited to verbal and behavioral means only. The *Army Leadership* ADRP lists nine different methods of influence for Army leaders to use, depending on the situation (2012d, 6-2). However, within the human domain and during an intercultural encounter, it is predominantly through use of 3C KSAs that influencing will occur. Pounding (2010) also discusses how various 3C KSAs facilitate understanding and influencing of others as necessary in order to achieve mission success.

The operationalization and application of 3C specifically within the human domain is another major point within this thesis paper. This concept of 3C KSA operationalization also fits with the ACFLS description of cultural capability applied at the individual level (2009, 9). Knowing about diagnosing, adapting, and customizing cultural behaviors, but switching cultural behavior is a choice, one that only you can make (Molinksy 2013). During intercultural military encounters, use of these attributes does not mean one needs to agree with others' actions and attitudes, but is useful to helping understand why they might develop or be displayed. This is directly relevant to

understanding and managing cultural differences (McCloskey et al. 2010). Molinsky (2013) also discusses the possibility of purposefully not adapting in order to achieve objectives; sometimes not adapting and forcing others to adapt to you may be required. This is something that is situational-dependend, but may be required for military purposes at times, such as during training of foreign forces. In order for such a technique to be effective, it would be dependent that the culturally-competent trainer understands the cultural schism which must be overcome by the other, and only when in support of a specific objective.

Operating within the human domain in a foreign culture can be challenging and may require overcoming mental, emotional, or other instinctive barriers and take them outside of their personal comfort zone. These are barriers formed by an individual's own culture and their own individual personality. Molinsky (2013) also discusses common challenges to adaptation to the foreign culture, including; authenticity—the feeling that the new behavior is in conflict with your internalize system of cultural values and beliefs (which can create feelings of anxiety, distress, or even guilt); competence—the feeling that your knowledge and skill are not up to the task of successfully adapting cultural behavior (which can create feelings of anxiety, embarrassment, or even shame); and resentment—the feeling that adapting cultural behavior is a burden and an imposition (which can create feelings of frustration or anger). This can result in regressing back to comfortable, yet counter-productive ethnocentric attitude. Attitude, motivation, and ability to act are important aspects of being functionally competent. As referenced earlier, Molinsky (2013) discusses anecdotal evidence of individuals who have the culture-specific knowledge, speak the local language, and understand and perhaps demonstrated

the necessary attributes and affect to succeed in the specific culture. However, native cultural boundaries might restrain them from being able to act accordingly when required. This refers to a schism between what he refers to as an individual's zone of comfort and the other culture's zone of appropriateness. He further discusses some techniques to bridge this gap while remaining true to self, such as adapting as a means to achieving a goal, learning the behavior from the perspective of the new culture, and giving oneself permission to adapt to different behavior. Molinsky also proposes some strategies to recover from faux pas during cultural encounters (2013). To be forgiven for the inevitable cultural faux pas, people will generally cut you some slack if you show interest in their culture, signal your foreignness, and work on developing a strong interpersonal connection (Molinsky 2013).

Operationalization combines the 3C capability with the motivation and ability to act (not always a given, and should not be assumed just because an individual has received training and demonstrated the capability within a simulated cross-cultural experience), as well as having a resulting desired outcome from the effort. Adjusting practices to avoid cultural offences when interacting with foreign others demonstrate good cultural awareness, which is probably a minimum level of cultural adeptness necessary. From any such scenario though, an individual with developing 3C KSAs, such as self-monitoring, open-mindedness, self-regulation, perspective-taking, and such, can work toward achieving better cognitive understanding, and then an ability to influence accordingly to achieve the mission.

Not being able to find other material addressing these issues, it might be an area for further research. Army leaders will potentially need to act outside of their personal

comfort zones, but in a way that does not clash with their personal values or the Army values. While Army leaders are regularly required to act outside of their individual comfort zones as part of their training and development, it is still within their native culture and Army sub-cultural boundaries.

3C is also a relevant capability for operations staff organized into the war-fighting functions. For the Army, culture is usually incorporated into planning as a miscellaneous element of operational and mission variables through the political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, information, physical environment, and time analysis tool, along with mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations, areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events construct, and the intelligence preparation of the battlefield process (Department of the Army 2012c). These planning tools derive measurable elements from the tangible aspect of physical domains. The Human Terrain System capability provides context to the human domain, but the skills to operate within it belong to the individual leader with the requisite knowledge of cultural schema and individual cultural self-identity. Some cross-cultural knowledge and skills, such as cognitive complexity and perspective-taking, are relevant even when job functions may not necessarily include routine interaction with foreign nationals (intelligence analysis or operational planning) (Abbe et al. 2008).

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command continues to update Army doctrine by way of adding a seventh war-fighting function of engagement. As a war-fighting function, engagement is the related tasks and systems that influence the behaviors of a people, security forces, and governments. Its focus will be on “routine contact and interaction” between U.S. Army forces and with unified action partners that “build trust

and confidence, share information, coordinate mutual activities and maintain influence” (Department of the Army 2014b, 5). According to the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command functional concept pamphlet (Department of the Army 2014b), the engagement WfF will institutionalize into Army doctrine, education, and leader development, the “capability and skills” necessary to work with host nations, regional partners, and indigenous populations in a “culturally attuned” manner that allows bridging language barriers, opening lines of communication and connections with key political and military leaders in a way that is both immediate and lasting. 3C provides that capability and skills for the cultural attuning. It further enhances the understanding by the Army that people are the basis of all military organizations, and military operations occur as human interactions (Department of the Army 2012b, 5). For this war-fighting function to be successful, it must incorporate strong 3C capabilities during either Phase 0 shaping (through engagement, building partnerships, etc.) or phase IV stability. These types of population-centric, or foreign military engagement operations contain scenarios where personal interactions and relationship-building may be a decisive point (Pounding 2010). Leaders must have the capacity to build relationships and influence others across cultures in order to successfully maintain a position of relative advantage or accomplish the mission.

Use of cultural dimensions can potentially aid intercultural effectiveness by serving as an “operational approach” to the cross-culture interactions in the human domain. The cultural dimensions models, specifically Hofstede’s, and their relevance to understanding culture and military operations, have been dismissed by some, for example; being labeled as having limited applicability to military personnel and likely to

perpetuate stereotyping (Salmoni and Holmes-Eber 2008, 20). Conversely though, Molinsky's (2013, xvi) dimensional model discussion specifically states that when speaking about cultural differences, author is describing prototypical (vs. stereotypical) cultural differences, by which he means the average or typical differences one would find within a population. These differences exist on average, but do not necessarily define how any particular individual person from a given culture will behave. It is perfectly reasonable that an adult service member would understand that an interaction with a laborer vs a politician would occur differently because of individual differences, regardless of being part of the same culture. Another consideration is that regardless of whether it is business or military personnel working across cultures, the interactions still occur within the human domain. Therefore, the derided psychological aspect of the approach is valid, as has been within the human domain that failures to adapt to certain dimensions have led to behaviors that contribute to cultural tensions or misunderstandings (Ibrahimov 2008, 243). Such culture-general approaches have the benefit of possessing broad relevance, as any culture can be characterized in terms of where it falls along the continuum of a particular dimension, according to Abbe and Halpin (2009-10).

### Application

The findings from this paper can be used by commanders to aid selecting personnel best suited for missions that require significant cross-cultural interaction and engagement in order to achieve mission success. RAF and those interacting with foreign forces should have appropriate understanding of how cultural adaptability at the tactical level can impact either favorably or negatively at the strategic level. For example,

engagement is not just going to run a range for host nation security forces in order to build partner capacity, but includes an inherent requirement to support relationship-building at that tactical or operational level, which will support developing good will and partnership building at the strategic level. So junior leaders must be not just competent to run the range, but after the day's work is done, to drink/dine with, socialize, etc. (activities in which the relevant KSAs such as interpersonal skills and rapport-building would be exercised) with the hosts instead of retreating to quarters. All interactions, even tangential, are opportunities to influence them favorably, especially if the engagement/training/exercise is being used to set the stage or shape the environment for future access, further engagements, and exercises. Army leaders do not always have the option to select specific individuals best suited according the 3C though, and are usually dictated instead by other military qualifications and skill requirements (i.e. medics, engineers, etc.). Therefore, they must develop unit-level cultural capabilities across the total force. So this is also applicable when training to support regional-alignment requirements, noting specifically that select service member disposition and personality traits are just as important as language and region-specific knowledge.

Use of behavioral and social science to better understand culture and its application to military operations has had heavy criticism in recent years, especially against the still relatively new Human Terrain System program (Connable 2009). However, there is potential for expanded use of it. Arguments support that developing a deep bench of expertise and better sociocultural analysis tools is needed to achieve mission success in the 21st century (Flynn et al. 2013). The Human Terrain System has worked to develop measure of effectiveness to backs up the argument for validating these

capabilities. Of course, the best sociocultural analysis tool in which to invest training is the mind of a culturally-adept leader at all levels of command in the operating environment.

Increased use of behavioral and social science helps support achieving cultural understanding, which usually lies between cultural awareness and 3C. The necessary level of cultural understanding is not just for cultural sensitivity purposes, to avoid cultural faux pas, but must be a depth of comprehension about how the specific culture influences individual and group behaviors, worldviews, and decision-making. This is also how culture can be better incorporated into the human factors aspects during the operations planning.

This paper already discussed the TRADOC Culture Center as a resource for leaders to further develop their own, and their subordinate's 3C. The Defense Language and National Security Education Office and Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute have jointly provided DoD's 3C portal for the purposes of providing tools and resources that promote discovery and learning to produce more effective leaders and operators. Their main page states how it is imperative that we build a Total Force that is not only globally aware, but also adept at interacting with people from a variety of cultures (DLNSEO and DEOMI 2013). These and other available resources remain available to be used for 3C training and education with some value, but to limited effect without addressing the affective domain (attitude, ethnocentrism, and motivation). The main effort for effectively developing a culturally adaptable force needs be changed in the ways discussed.

### Organizational Culture

It is also important to understand that 3C is a relevant skill set for leaders even when not operating in a foreign environment. Culture is not limited to foreign countries or peoples, but also exists within organizations (Department of the Army 2009). This includes the U.S. military, which has a unique culture distinct in many ways from civilian culture, and even other organizations and agencies of the government. Edgar Schein's models of culture describes organizational culture as a pattern of shared basic assumptions that was learned by a group as it solved its problems of external adaption and internal integration, that has worked well enough to be considered valid, and therefore to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems (Schein 1997). It is a commonly accepted model also used by the private sector, who understand workplace culture is important to effective business productivity.

Army leaders must be able to adapt to the organizational cultures within external agencies as a matter of professional necessity. The U.S. military routinely partners with other U.S. government organizations as part of unified action and also routinely conducts multinational operations with coalition and allied partners. Because of the current military strategy to engage and build partnerships, this trend will continue for a long time and should be expected to increase in frequency. The current joint doctrine on multinational operations touches on elements of 3C. It states that the nature of multinational operations include respect, rapport, knowledge of partners, respect, mission focus, and trust and confidence (Joint Chiefs of Staff 2013). The manual notes that while the tenants discussed cannot guarantee success, ignoring them may lead to mission failure

due to a lack of unity of effort. The multinational operations tenants function much like 3C KSAs at the organizational level. In addition, of course, the actual implementation of these tenets is through Army leaders, who must be individually capable of developing and fostering them. This includes high levels of cultural flexibility and tolerance of ambiguity, and low levels of ethnocentrism required in jobs with complex international and multicultural responsibilities, as found in the empirical study by Caligiuri and Tarique (2012). Their finding further highlights the importance of dynamic cross-cultural competencies (KSAs) in contributing to global leadership effectiveness. As an organization that measures itself by success of assigned mission, Army leaders bear the responsibility to achieve intercultural effectiveness in Joint, Interagency, Inter-Governmental, and Multinational environments.

Leaders are in positions to influence others as necessary to achieve mission success, and for field-grade officers, they should also improve the organization. 3C leaders can develop their organizations to become more culturally-competent through their influence. Army leader doctrine notes that influence is achieved through a variety of methods. This is certainly also true about organizations, and building a culturally-capable unit is best achieved through a multi-faceted approach.

#### Recommendations for Future Research

The most important recommendation for future work is to further examine how to actually incorporate 3C and adaptability into leader doctrine. This paper sees leader doctrine as starting point before anything else can be expected, such as full integration across Doctrine, Operations, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities. The challenge is to determine how to develop standards and testing for 3C KSAs as a

requirement of LDE, make them usable for the field. This thesis proposed a format in the style of the officer evaluation report performance evaluation guide. As all military personnel need some level of 3C, this should also include work on how to actually train and develop these KSAs across the total force, not just leaders. This will require collaboration between leadership doctrine experts, behavioral and social scientists, and cultural anthropology experts, among others.

Another area for further research is to determine how to resolve high ethnocentrism (or nationalism) within the force, being necessary to motivate service to country and dehumanizing of enemies, against the research that shows it as counterproductive to intercultural effectiveness and relationship-building at the human level upon which we are relying for our strategy going forward.

The last area for future research is potential for use of the various cultural dimensions models (vis-à-vis Molinsky and Hofstede) by the military to serve as an “operational approach” to intercultural interactions within the human domain. Used correctly, they provide a bridge between the culture-general knowledge element of 3C and culture-specific regional competence. 3C provides the capability to interact across cultures, whereas cultural dimensions could inform the how-to aspect.

## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUSION

Cross-Cultural Competence is about acquiring knowledge, and honing the skills necessary to relate, negotiate, influence, motivate, manage, adapt, plan and execute effectively across cultural lines both domestic and abroad.

— DLNSEO and DEOMI,  
“DoD 3C Cross-Cultural Competence”

The first chapter discussed the present and future security environment as described in national policy, the strategy going forward of engagement and building relationships, and the plan to use regionally-aligned forces as a culturally-enabled force. Army Doctrine Reference Publication 6-0, *Mission Command* lays out that “Cultural competence underlies a Soldier’s ability to understand, communicate, and coordinate effectively with diverse groups of people. Leaders and Soldiers interact with friendly forces, enemy forces, adversaries, supporters, and neutral parties. The art of command includes exploiting these dynamics to the advantage of friendly forces and to the disadvantage of an enemy” (Department of the Army 2012b, 2-11). The exploitation of those dynamics is achieved when leaders are able to use their 3C for enhanced cultural understanding, and potentially anticipate how others will behave or make decisions because of those considerations, and adapt accordingly to influence.

The first important point from this paper is to just know what the specific 3C KSAs are, and their relevance to intercultural effectiveness. Knowledge is the first step to change or improvement in oneself, and motivated Army leaders can use knowledge of 3C KSAs to self-develop themselves and their subordinate leaders. This paper highlighted several predominant KSAs (knowledge of cultural schema, cultural self-identity, open-

mindedness, self-efficacy, interpersonal skills, perspective-taking skills, extroversion, self-monitoring, low need for closure, high tolerance for ambiguity, self-regulation, and ethnocentrism) and how they apply to 3C. Achieving 3C means arriving at the point of being able to bridge or transform differences through relationship-building, and developing the skills necessary to prevent or overcome misunderstandings which may divide further instead of bringing together on common ground and mutual interests (Deardorff 2009).

The relationship and intersection between 3C, adaptability, and leadership for achieving global leadership competence has been discussed in depth. This paper argues that the current Army leader requirements and development models need updated to include 3C and adaptability in order to meet the needs for engaging a complex global operating environment. 3C needs integrated throughout LDE and incorporated into the next version of the Army performance evaluation guide and throughout the Doctrine, Operations, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities construct.

This paper should help understanding of the relevance of the human domain, and how 3C is operationalized within it. As the human domain concept continues to evolve, 3C can help inform its function and relevance to military operations. Although the other two 3C framework components of language and regional expertise would further aid operationalization of culture within the human domain, an Army leader must be able to achieve this without necessarily knowing the local language or having culture-specific regional expertise. Given the establishment of RAF, there is high probability that Army leaders will be placed in such a situation. This includes leaders at all levels, from small functional units participating in an exchange activity to larger maneuver units

conducting multinational combined arms exercises. Foreign partners will be more likely to support U.S. military operations based upon the relationships formed and sustained during engagements and security cooperation activities (Department of the Army 2014b, 13). The Joint Force must increase interoperability in each aspect of the Joint, Interagency, Inter-Governmental, and Multinational environment to be successful in the future.

As discussed, language and regional competence are only two components of 3C framework, and there are well-developed strategies for them in place. As a global force, the U.S. military must be prepared to conduct operations in any culture around the world, not just those that are currently high on radar now. The many cultures within any given geographic combatant command areas of responsibilities are distinctly different from each other, and it is simply unfeasible to develop the requisite language and regional expertise for all of the potential locations in the world where the United States might conduct military operations in the future. Some U.S. strategy documents acknowledge this, which requires assessing and prioritizing the areas of focus, and therefore assuming informed risk for the other regions. This discussion does not argue against that approach. However, it does point out that a 3C capable force helps mitigate that risk when the next conflict requires the U.S. military to deploy and conduct operations in an unexpected location. As such, Cross-Cultural Competence is an Army leader requirement for intercultural effectiveness in support of a globally-engaged force.

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